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Background
With the rapid development of cloud computing and mobile networking technologies, 
users tend to access their stored data from the remote cloud storage with mobile devices. 
The main advantage of cloud storage is its ubiquitous user accessibility and also its virtu-
ally unlimited data storage capabilities. Despite such benefits provided by the cloud, the 
major challenge that remains is the concern over the confidentiality and privacy of data 
while adopting the cloud storage services [1]. For instance, unencrypted user data stored 
at the remote cloud server can be vulnerable to external attacks initiated by unauthor-
ized outsiders and internal attacks initiated by the untrustworthy cloud service providers 
(CSPs) [2]. There are several reports that confirm data breaches related to cloud servers, 
due to malicious attack, theft or internal errors [3]. This raises concern for many users/
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organizations as the outsourced data might contain very sensitive personal organization/
information.
Several researches have addressed the issue of ensuring confidentiality and privacy 
of cloud data without compromising the user functionality. Here, confidentiality refers 
to the secrecy of the stored data so that only the client can read the contents of the 
stored data. To solve the problem of confidentiality, data encryption schemes can come 
in handy to provide the users with some control over the secrecy of their stored data. 
This has been adopted by many recent researches which allow users to encrypt their 
data before outsourcing to the cloud [4–9]. However, standard encryption schemes will 
dampen users’ searching ability over the stored data, since after encryption a user sim-
ply cannot use a plaintext keyword to perform a search anymore and therefore cannot 
retrieve the contents in an efficient way.
The keyword search functionality enables the user to search for a certain keyword on 
the remote cloud data. Consider a cloud application that consists of a cloud service pro-
vider (CSP), and users who store their data on the cloud storage. The users can use a 
traditional encryption scheme to ensure the confidentiality of the contents. The naïve 
approach for retrieving encrypted contents related to a certain keyword would require 
the user to download all the stored data, and then decrypt and perform the search on the 
local machine. However, this solution is infeasible from a practical point of view, as the 
user needs to download all the contents rather than the contents containing the searched 
keyword. For example, consider a scenario where the cloud storage contains 1  GB of 
user’s data, but only 1 MB of data is related to the searched keyword. Using the naïve 
solution, it is required to retrieve all the 1 GB data, which is inefficient. Alternatively, the 
user can store a plaintext keyword index in the cloud server and use it while retrieving 
the data. However, this approach will allow the CSPs to know about the keyword which 
is not desirable either. Therefore, to ease the data retrieval from a secure cloud, we need 
a scheme which enables user capability to search over encrypted contents.
To provide a secure and efficient retrieval of data, one needs to ensure that the user 
can perform a search over the encrypted data without revealing the contents and the 
searched keyword to the server. The cryptographic primitive that provides this feature 
is widely known as searchable encryption (SE). This research aims to study the search-
able encryption schemes in detail and implements a solution that enables privacy pre-
serving data storage and retrieval system in cloud computing (aka PrivCloud). For our 
implementation, we have chosen an existing searchable symmetric key encryption algo-
rithm. To enable the privacy preserving keyword search, this scheme will generate an 
encrypted keyword index which will be outsourced to the cloud server along with the 
encrypted data set. The encrypted keyword index lists out the encrypted keyword and 
pointer to the corresponding document containing that keyword. To search a keyword, 
client can simply encrypt the keyword to generate the search token and send it to the 
remote cloud server. The server can retrieve pointer to the corresponding document by 
matching the search token with the encrypted keyword index table. For our proposed 
solution, we have chosen to index all the words from the document instead of a specific 
keyword set. This will allow the client to search for any word in the document rather 
than any specific keyword. Also, indexing all the words of the document make sure that 
the user does not need to maintain a keyword index table at the client side since it can 
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search for any words. However, indexing all the words will come with the trade-off of a 
slightly larger index size. One of the limitations of the proposed solution is that it does 
not support the addition of new files since the index update is static.
Background on searchable encryption
This section provides a detailed background on the searchable encryption scheme. 
In particular, we discuss about the architecture, security requirements and design 
approaches for searchable encryption scheme.
Searchable encryption: architecture
Searchable encryption (SE) enables the users to generate a search token from the 
searched keyword in such way that given a token, the cloud server can retrieve the 
encrypted contents containing the searched keyword. Basically, the search token rep-
resents an encrypted query over the encrypted data and can be generated only by users 
with the appropriate secret key. Figure 1 shows the basic architecture and working prin-
ciple of a searchable encryption scheme. The architecture comprises mainly four enti-
ties: data owner, data user, cloud service provider and key generator. A brief description 
of the entities and their operations are given below.
A. Data owner: The data owner is the entity which generates and encrypts the data and 
uploads them to the cloud server. It can be either an organization or an individual. To 
use the service, the data owner uses its application which consists of a data processor 
Data Owner Data User
Cloud Service Provider
Data Server Service Manager





Figure 1 Architecture of a searchable encryption scheme. The figure shows the general architecture and 
components of a searchable encryption scheme. It describes the workflow of the searchable encryption 
scheme.
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for uploading new contents to the cloud. It encrypts the data and metadata with a 
cryptographic scheme [1] that enables searching capability.
B. Data user: This entity is also a subscriber to the cloud storage which sends encrypted 
queries to the cloud service provider to search for a specific encrypted data. There 
may be more than one data user in the system and in some scenario, the data owner 
and the data user might be the same entity.
C. Cloud service provider: This entity provides the data storage and retrieval service to 
the subscribers. The cloud service provider consists of cloud data server and cloud 
service manager. The first entity is used to store the outsourced encrypted data 
whereas the latter one is used for data management in the cloud. Upon receiving the 
encrypted search queries from the data user, the cloud service provider tests on the 
encrypted queries and encrypted metadata in the cloud storage. The encrypted data 
that satisfies the search criteria is retrieved and sent back to the data owner upon 
completion of the test. The cloud service provider should not learn any information 
from the operation.
D. Key generator: This entity is considered to be a trusted third party which is respon-
sible for the generation and management of the encryption/ decryption keys. User 
specific keys are generated and distributed during the setup of the system.
Searchable encryption: security requirements
In general, the following requirements should be satisfied when constructing a search-
able encryption scheme.
  • Retrieved data: Server should not be able to distinguish between documents and 
determine search contents.
  • Search query: Server should not learn anything about the keyword being searched for. 
Given a token, the server can retrieve nothing other than pointers to the encrypted 
content that contains the keyword.
  • Query generation: Server should not be able to generate a coded query. The query 
can be generated by only those users with the relevant secret key.
  • Search query outcome: Server should not learn anything about the contents of the 
search outcome.
  • Access patterns: Server should not learn about the sequences and frequency of docu-
ments accessed by the user.
  • Query patterns: Server should not learn whether two tokens were intended for the 
same query.
Searchable encryption: design approaches
Searchable encryption scheme can be built using either a non-keyword based approach 
or an index/keyword based approach. In the non-keyword based approach, the scheme 
scans the entire document word by word to find out the word W of interest. This pro-
vides the functionality to search any words in the document. However, it takes a long 
search time for a large number of document set. On the other hand, index/keyword 
based solution builds up an index [10], for each word W of interest and lists out the 
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corresponding documents that contain W. This provides a faster search operation when 
the document set is large. However, storing and updating the index can be an overhead.
From the viewpoint of cryptographic algorithm selection, the SE scheme can mainly 
be modeled using either asymmetric/public key or symmetric/secret key setting. In the 
following, we briefly discuss the difference between these two settings.
A. Asymmetric searchable encryption (ASE): In this setting, a user encrypts the data 
using asymmetric/public key encryption schemes (e.g. RSA) before outsourcing it to 
the cloud server. This setting is appropriate for a scenario where the user searching 
over the data is different from the user who generates it. For example, multiple users 
can use the public key of a certain user to encrypt and upload the data, however; 
only the owner with the corresponding private key can generate the search token and 
therefore can perform a search over the encrypted data. The main advantage of ASE 
is its functionality whereas the drawback is inefficiency. ASE schemes can be used in 
a larger number of settings since the reader and writer can be different for this case. 
On the other hand, all known ASE schemes require the evaluation of pairings on 
elliptic curves which is a relatively slow and costly operation compared to the hash 
functions or block ciphers [1]. Several researches have been conducted in developing 
SE scheme using public key cryptography [11–16].
B. Symmetric searchable encryption (SSE): In this setting, a user encrypts the data using 
symmetric/private key encryption schemes (e.g. AES) before outsourcing it to the 
cloud server. This setting is appropriate when the user that searches over the data 
is also the one who generates it. The main advantage of this setting is the efficiency, 
but it lacks of functionality as it can only be used for a single user scenario. Moreo-
ver, most of the SSE schemes leaks the access patterns. The encryption is efficient 
because most SSE schemes are based on symmetric primitives like block-ciphers and 
pseudo-random functions and requires very less computational overhead. The SSE 
scheme was first proposed by Song et al. [17] which provides techniques for remote 
searching over encrypted data using symmetric key primitives. Later, security 
notions of SSE schemes were revisited and stronger security definitions were pro-
vided by Goh [10], Chang et al. [18] and Curtmola et al. [19].
Related work
In this section, we present a brief summary of related works dealing with the searchable 
encryption schemes. Searchable encryption scheme can be designed based on either 
public key or symmetric key algorithm. The first searchable encryption scheme based 
on public key algorithm was proposed by Boneh et al. [11]. This is known as the PEKS 
scheme which uses the public key of a user to encrypt and store the data in the server, 
and allows an authorized user with the private key to search and decrypt the corre-
sponding content. This is a keyword based scheme ensuring faster search functionality; 
however, limiting the search capability. Also, the scheme is computationally expensive 
and it reveals the user access pattern. An extension of the PEKS scheme was proposed by 
Liu et al. [14]. This also uses the public key primitive to support the keyword searching 
on encrypted data. This scheme allows the cloud service provider to participate in the 
partial decipherment and claims to have reduced computational overhead on the client 
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due to this partial decipherment. Another variant of the PEKS scheme called iPEKS was 
proposed by Tseng et al. [15]. This scheme aims to accelerate the search time by looking 
into the previously searched keywords. For this, the cloud service provider caches the 
previously searched keywords to avoid the search on all the stored ciphertexts. How-
ever, this comes with the tradeoff of large storage overhead. The first searchable encryp-
tion scheme based on symmetric key primitive was proposed by Song et al. [17]. This 
provides a non-keyword based solution. However, this scheme can search for only fixed 
length words and also the search time is linear in document size, since the it needs to 
scan the whole document to complete the search. The scheme is too slow when search-
ing for a large number of documents. Goh [10] addresses some of the issues of the above 
scheme by introducing the concept of a secure index. This scheme generates a search 
index which can be used to locate the encrypted content. Later, the security notions of 
searchable symmetric encryption were revisited and stronger security definitions were 
provided by Curtmola et al. [19]. This is a very simple scheme based on keyword index-
ing approach.
Proposed solution
This research aims to design and develop a privacy preserving data storage and retrieval 
system in cloud computing. The scopes involve the use of searchable encryption algo-
rithms to search for specific keywords within an encrypted content, i.e., without requir-
ing the user to download the database and decrypt its contents before searching can be 
performed. The proposed solution delegates searching on encrypted data to CSP but with 
privacy preserved. For the searchable encryption algorithm, we have chosen to imple-
ment the adaptively secure Searchable Symmetric encryption (referred as SSE-2 scheme in 
the original paper) scheme proposed by Curtmola et al. [19]. For the rest of the paper, we 
will use the term SSE-2 scheme or adaptively secure SSE scheme to refer to the proposed 
method by Curtmola et al. The SSE-2 scheme provides a simple but efficient method to 
enable searching over encrypted data while preserving the data privacy. The reason behind 
selecting a private/symmetric key primitive for our implementation mainly lies in the fact 
that it results in significantly lesser computational overhead when compared to its public/
asymmetric key counterpart and therefore will be more suitable for mobile devices.
Adaptively secure searchable symmetric encryption
In this section, we describe the adaptively secure SSE algorithm proposed by Curtmola 
et al. [19]. As the name suggests, the scheme is based on the symmetric key encryption 
setting and therefore mostly suitable for a single reader/single writer scenario. It uses the 
index based approach [10], where user has to pre-process the contents to generate a key-
word index to provide for the search capability. Figure 2 shows the construction of the 
adaptively secure searchable symmetric encryption scheme.
As shown in Figure 2, a user U encrypts a set of data D = {D1,D2, · · · ,Dn} and creates 
an encrypted index file I which contains a set of m encrypted keywords extracted from 
the data set D. In order to conduct a search over the encrypted data, user U outsources 
the index I and the encrypted data set D to the cloud server. During a search, U creates 
an encrypted query and sends it to the server. Cloud server takes this encrypted query as 
input and then uses the encrypted index located at the server to retrieve pointers to the 
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document(s) containing the searched keyword. Once the search result is obtained, the 
encrypted document(s) containing the searched keyword is returned to the client.
The scheme mainly consists of six functional entities: key generation, document pre-
processing, encryption, search token generation, search and decryption. Functions of 
each entity/ block are described as follows:
A. Key generation: It generates the keys for encryption and decryption using a symmet-
ric key primitive. Two keys K1 and K2 are generated for encryption of index contents 
and documents respectively. Both keys are generated and stored securely at the user 
device. Note that this is a symmetric key primitive and therefore same key is used for 
both encryption or decryption purposes.
B. Document re-processing: This block provides the necessary function to pre-process 
a set of documents and initialize the encryption procedure. Before encrypting the 
set of documents, the user needs to pre-process the document set to pull out the 
keyword and build an index. Let D defines a set of document to be encrypted and 
uploaded in the cloud server. The user has to list out all the keywords from each 
document in D and build an index table listing the documents and the correspond-
ing keywords. The scheme will also assign a content ID for each of the documents in 
the set. For example, consider a set of 5 documents D = {D1,D2,D3,D4,D5} to be 
uploaded in the cloud. At the pre-processing step, the user will pre-process these set 











Figure 2 Working principle of adaptively secure SSE scheme to search over encrypted data. The figure 
shows the work‑flow of the searchable symmetric encryption scheme. This scheme generates and stores an 
encrypted index at the cloud server to enable search over encrypted data.
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represents the keyword and m is the total number (m = 10 for this example) of key-
words. The content IDs are assigned sequentially starting from 1.  In the next step, it 
will create an inverted index table which lists out the respective content IDs for each 
keyword wi. For the above example, the inverted index is shown in Table 2. 
C. Encryption: This block provides the functionality to encrypt the index and document 
set. The encryption is performed using the encryption keys generated at the key gen-
eration step. Basically, it consists of index encryption and document encryptions and 
performs as described below: Index encryption This encrypts the keyword set gener-
ated at the pre-processing step and creates an encrypted index/lookup table. The key-
word encryption is computed as ENCK1(wi||ni), where ENCK1 represents encryption 
with key K1, wi is the keyword i and ni is the corresponding document ID containing 
keyword wi. For each of the encrypted keywords, the encrypted index table lists out 
the corresponding document ID. For our example document set, the encrypted index 
table is shown in Table 3. Document encryption: This encrypts each document from 
the document set D with key K2, and stores it in the database. The document encryp-
tion is computed as ENCK2(Di) which represents encryption of document Di with key 
K2. For the above example, the encrypted document lists are shown in Table 4. 
D. Search token generation: This block is used when a user wants to search for a doc-
ument containing a certain keyword. It provides the user/client with the func-
tionality of generating a search token/ trapdoor which can be used at the server 
to perform a search over encrypted documents. To carry out the search opera-
tion, the user will input the search keyword and then compute the search token. 
The search token for a keyword wq is computed as follows: Search Token, 












, where n is 
Table 1 Document index creation
Content/ document Content ID Keyword
D1 1 w1, w5
D2 2 w1, w3, w8
D3 3 w2, w9, w5
D4 4 w6, w7, w9
D5 5 w1, w4, w10
Table 2 Inverted index
Keyword Content ID
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the total number of documents in the document set D. For our example of 5 docu-
ment sets, the search token for keyword wq will be t = (t1, t2, t3, t4, t5). Once com-
puted, the search token is sent to the server to find out the corresponding document 
containing the searched keyword.
E. Search: The search function takes the search token and the encrypted index table as 
input and outputs the document list containing the searched keyword. For a search 
token t = (t1, t2, · · · , tn) it will compare with the encrypted index if any of the values 
in t matches with the encrypted keyword. It outputs the corresponding document 
IDs which match the search token and then send back the respective documents to 
the client.
F. Decryption: The client decrypts back the document once it has obtained the 
encrypted document set containing the searched keyword. The document decryp-
tion is computed as DECK2(Di) which represents decryption of document Di with 
key K2.
Implementation of PrivCloud system
This section provides the detailed description for our implementation of the adaptively 
secure SSE scheme, aka PrivCloud. This implementation considers a single writer/ single 
Table 3 Encrypted index















Table 4 Encrypted document list
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reader scenario where the user that searches over the data is also the one who generates 
it. First of all, we provide the basic framework for our implementation.
Framework of the PrivCloud system
The PrivCloud system implements the SSE-2 scheme [19] which consists of the follow-
ing modules: encryption, search and decryption. These modules are integrated with a 
Key Generator block which provides the encryption/ decryption keys.
A. Encryption: This module provides the document and index encryption functionality. 
Figure 3 shows the framework for the implementation of the SSE-2 Encryption mod-
ule. First, the key generator is initiated to generate keys. Since symmetric key genera-
tion does not require much computational power, we assume that the key generator is 
located at the user device. This resolves the key distribution issue. The key generation 
is a one-time process to generate and store the keys. After the key generation, a user 
inputs a set of document for the encryption and index creation. When user inputs the 
document set, the Encryption module uses the Keyword Extractor block to pull out the 
keyword and builds an index of all the words in the document. After keyword extrac-
tion, input documents and the document index are fetched to the Encryption block. The 
Encryption block uses the keys generated by the key generator to create the encrypted 
document set and encrypted document index. Concurrently, the Encryption block also 
creates a filename mapping object/ filename index which contains the mapping of docu-
ment IDs to the corresponding original filenames and extensions. This is stored in plain-
text at the user device. Finally, the encrypted files are uploaded to the server.
B. Search: The search module provides the functionality of searching a keyword over 
the encrypted data stored at the cloud server. Figure  4 shows the framework for 
the implementation of the SSE-2 search module. When user inputs the searched 
EncryptionUSER






























Convert into .txt file and pull out 
the keywords for Index creation




Figure 3 Encryption module. The figure shows the working principle of different blocks in the encryption 
module of the PrivCloud system. The encryption module provides the document and index encryption 
functionality.
Page 11 of 16Salam et al. Hum. Cent. Comput. Inf. Sci.  (2015) 5:19 
keyword(s), Search Token Generation computes a search token(s)/ trapdoor(s) using 
the keyword/index encryption key. This generated search token is then sent to the 
cloud server to perform the search operation. Upon receiving the search token, the 
cloud server find out pointer(s) to the appropriate encrypted documents by compar-
ing the search token with the encrypted index values. Following this, the cloud server 
retrieves the encrypted document(s) containing the searched keyword(s) and sends 
it back to the client along with the corresponding document ID(s).
C. Decryption: The Decryption module that is located at the user’s device provides the 
decryption functionality for a given set of encrypted documents. Figure  5 shows 
the basic construction for the  SSE-2 Decryption module. The Decryption module 
requires Encrypted Document, corresponding Document ID, Document Decryption 
Key and Filename Mapping Object as input. First, the Decryption module uses the 
filename mapping object and the document ID to retrieve the original filename and 
extension of the encrypted document. Then it decrypts the document using the doc-








Return Document ID(s) 
Containing Searched Keyword 





Figure 4 Search module. The figure shows the working principle of different blocks in the search module of 
the PrivCloud system. This module enables a cloud user to generate an encrypted query to the server. The 
cloud server can use this encrypted query to search over the encrypted data without knowing the contents 
of the data or the query.
USER Document Decryption Key
Input Encrypted Document
Decryption
Return Decrypted Document 
Filename Mapping Object
Document ID 
Figure 5 Decryption module. The figure shows the working principle of different blocks in the decryption 
module of the PrivCloud system. This module provides the decryption functionality.
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Implementation details
The scheme is implemented and tested under the following environment: Java 1.7.0_51
, Windows 8.1 64-bit operating system. Based on the framework, we divide our imple-
mentation into four main class structures: Key Generation, Encryption, Search and 
Decryption.
A. Key generation class: We use the standard javax.crypto library to generate the AES 
keys. Two 128-bit AES keys (i.e., keyword encryption key, K1 and document encryp-
tion key, K2) are generated and stored. The key generation class has 3 methods:
• generate () : This method generates two 128-bit AES keys.
•   store () : This method converts the generated keys (encoded) into strings, writes 
into a Key object and then stores it to a location at the user device.
•   read () : This provides the functionality to read the keys from user. The method 
read () takes the Key object as input and reads the key values. Following this, it 
will convert the key string to an array of bytes and then construct the correspond-
ing secret key from the given byte of array.
B. Encryption class: The encryption is performed at user device before outsourcing the 
data to the cloud server. This creates the database containing the encrypted docu-
ment set and encrypted index. Before performing encryption one needs to pre-pro-
cess the data to retrieve the keyword and create an index. The SSE-2 scheme extracts 
only a set of distinct keywords to create an index. However, in our implementation 
we create an index of the whole document rather than a finite number of distinct 
keyword set. This gives a user the flexibility to search for any words in the document 
rather than a selected keyword and also user does not need to keep the keyword 
index stored at its own device. We consider the initializing/pre-processing of docu-
ments within the Encryption block. The pre-processing step includes:
•  Document ID allocation: For each document, it assigns a unique document ID. 
The document ID will be assigned starting from 0 and will increase sequentially.
•   Keyword extraction: The keyword extraction process searches for consecutive 
sequences of non-blank and non-punctuation characters. It can easily be tweaked 
to search for consecutive sequences of ASCII characters. This provides adequate 
results for binary files containing uncompressed English text. To read out the 
characters from an input document, we need to convert it to a text file first and 
for this file conversion we have used the Apache Tika. The keyword extractor is 
implemented by pulling characters from stream, checking if they are acceptable, 
and accumulating consecutive acceptable characters into a keyword. An addi-
tional functionality is also provided where one can limit the number of total key-
words by selecting a minimum length of characters in a keyword. For example, 
if we select the minimum keyword length to be 4 characters, then the keyword 
extraction algorithm will pull out only those keywords which have 4 or more 
ASCII characters.
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 After pre-processing process the encryption module outputs the encrypted files. We 
use AES/CBC/PKCS5 for the document and index encryption. Encryption class consists 
of mainly two methods: encrypt () and witeDocIDFileNameMapping ().
•  encrypt () : This function takes as input all the files from user given path and 
encrypt all the files and also creates an encrypted index. For each input file the 
function retrieves the keywords first and for each keyword it computes the 128-
bit AES encryption of the keyword and document ID. Then, it creates an index 
entry in the encrypted index table to list out the encrypted keyword and the 




 specified in Java TreeMap 
interface to associate the specified value (document ID) with the specified key 
(encrypted keyword). Finally, it saves the encrypted index in the database. The 
input documents are ready for encryption once the indexing is finished. For 
the encryption of a document, this method first creates a new document in the 
database and writes the encrypted stream in this. For each encrypted document, 
the corresponding document ID is used as the new filename of the encrypted 
document.
•   writeDocIDFileNameMapping () : This method is used to create and store a file-
name mapping object /filename index which stores the ID of an encrypted docu-
ment and the corresponding filename. It uses hash table to map the keys (docu-
ment ID) into values (filename). This object is stored at client and utilized during 
decryption for the mapping of document ID to retrieve original filename and 
extension of the document.
 Figure 6 shows the detail flowchart of the encryption procedure.
C. Search class: The search operation is initiated at the user device and performed in the 
cloud server. The operation consists of two methods: searchToken () and search ().
•  searchToken () : This takes the keyword and document ID as input and computes 
the search token at the client device. The keyword encryption key is used to 
compute the encrypted value of the user given keyword and returns the gener-
ated search token. The search token is then sent to the server.
•   search () : This takes place at the server when it receives a search request from the 
user. This method takes the search token and the user database as input to find 
out the document IDs containing the search result. It uses get() defined in the Java 
TreeMap class, which returns the value to which the specified key is mapped, or 
null if this map contains no mapping for the key. Finally, server retrieves the cor-
responding document and sends back to the client for decryption.
D. Decryption class: This initiates the decrypt () method when the client receives the 
encrypted document from the server.
•   decrypt () : This method decrypts back the data in its plaintext form by using 
the user decryption key stored at the client device. Once the user has input the 
encrypted document, the program reads the corresponding document ID from 
the filename of the encrypted document. Then, it uses the filename index stored 
at the user device and gets the original filename and extension for an encrypted 
document by using its ID. Then, it reads the input stream from the encrypted 
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document and decrypts back the plaintext content using the corresponding 
decryption key. Lastly, this method generates a new document with the retrieved 
original filename and extension and then writes the decrypted plaintext stream 
into this file and stores it in the user device.
Conclusion
This article provides the details of our implementation of Curtmola’s SSE scheme for the 
PrivCloud System. For our implementation, we have chosen the AES/ CBC mode for 
the encryption/decryption purpose. Our implementation indexes the whole document 
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Figure 6 Flowchart for the document and index encryption process. The figure shows the flowchart of the 
encryption module for the PrivCloud system. It provides detail work‑flow of the module to compute the 
encrypted document and encrypted index.
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rather than a set of keyword from each document as proposed in the SSE-2 scheme, 
which provides the user capability to search any keyword from the document with the 
trade-off of a slightly larger index size. Also, the client does not need to maintain a key-
word index on its side. However, the index update process is static in our implementa-
tion, which does not allow the addition of new files or updating files. On the other hand, 
our encryption module requires slightly longer time since this also includes the conver-
sion of documents into text file for the keyword extraction process. A faster encryption 
process can be obtained if the keyword extraction module can work without the docu-
ment conversion process.
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